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The dissertation researches the impact that key performance measures, notably, ROA and ROE, 
Turnover, Net Dividend Yield, have on executives’ compensation, focusing on three specific regions, 
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, and Portugal and Spain.  
The method used was to apply an econometric regression model –OLS–, with selected corrections, 
due to heteroscedasticity by means of a robust regression. The sample consisted of 98 FTSE100 
Companies, 62 OMX Nordic companies, and 40 companies from IBEX and PSI20 combined. 
The results obtained showed there is little evidence of the relation of firm performance with 
compensation, but that there is a strong relationship between these variables and company size, which 
is most significant in the UK. Also, there are marked differences amongst the regions, namely the 
significance that Net Dividend Yield has in the region of Iberia, and the non-significance of most 
variables for the Nordic region. 
Key-words: Executive compensation, Remuneration, Europe, Performance  
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1. Introduction 
The correlation between executive compensation and firm performance has been vastly studied over 
the years, with a large increase in popularity since the Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat’s scandals, 
where the compensation scheme incentivized executives to sacrifice long-term benefits for short-term 
ones to maximise bonuses, as well as, the 2008 financial crisis, resulting in banks’ bankruptcies, while 
CEOs maintained or increased salaries and bonuses. Investors became aware of the magnitude of 
CEOs’ compensation packages, since 72% of the 50 biggest layoff leaders ended 2009 with a profit 
(Anderson, S. et al., 2010), as well as situations where CEOs that laid-off hundreds of employees 
received millionaire bonuses. Due to these situations, interest has been sparked in reviewing 
executives’ compensation packages to understand if, in fact, their compensation helped to align their 
interests with those of the firm.  
In this empirical work, different types of compensation are regressed for three different regions (UK, 
two Nordic countries, and Iberia), to find insights on how this relationship differs from country to 
country, as well as to identify selected similarities in terms of the most relevant independent variables; 
the objective is also to research if there are differences among regions, which were not clear before this 
research.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Compensation 
Compensation has been vastly studied in different contexts, whether executives are receiving enough, 





 Compensation as an incentive 
According to (Zajac, E.J., 1990), compensation is seen as a “control mechanism for increasing 
individual motivation and achievement”, which is in agreement with what (Ryan, H.E. & Wiggins, 
R.A., 2004)‘s results that state, “compensation is a reinforcing mechanism”. This study further says 
that “independent boards, which are generally associated with good corporate governance, receive 
compensation packages that are more closely aligned with shareholder wealth maximization”. There is 
a consensus that compensation is used as an incentive to align executives’ interest with those of 
shareholders as to maximize wealth.  
Managerial entrenchment 
The concept of managerial entrenchment is discussed in various studies, namely (Ryan, H.E. & 
Wiggins, R.A., 2004) that states that “firms with entrenched managers receive significantly smaller 
compensation packages” and that they receive “a smaller proportion of compensation in the form of 
equity-based awards”. They also argue that “directors on boards with more insiders and larger boards 
also receive less equity-based pay as a percentage of their total compensation”. This suggests that as 
executives become entrenched, their compensation is less composed of components that align their 
interests with those of shareholders, and more cash based, they receive more without having to make 
sure the shareholder wealth is maximized, guaranteeing their pay even if the company performs 
poorly. 
Executives can influence their own pay 
Several studies argue that executives can influence their own pay, for instance, (Ryan, H.E. & 
Wiggins, R.A., 2004) claims that “directors or CEO influence the size and the structure of the 
compensation package in their own interest”. Furthermore, (Boyle, G. & Roberts, H., 2012) argues 
initially that they expect executives in the compensation committees to have the highest salaries, but 
later discover that, comparing firms with the CEO on the board, on the committee and excluded from 
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both, that in contrast with popular belief that a CEO being present on the compensation committee 
would influence their salary positively, the “CEOs who sit on the compensation committee receive the 
lowest annual growth in compensation but the firms they lead also perform significantly less well”. 
Suggesting that at least in New Zealand, where the study is conducted, CEOs present on the board act 
rather conservatively compared to when they are not, presenting a “challenge to the ‘managerial 
power’ view of CEO compensation, since this would imply that CEOs use compensation committee 
presence to extract excess compensation”. Furthermore, they find that “CEOs who are not on the 
board lead the best-performing firms, but receive relatively little reward for doing so”, agreeing with 
the theory that the most independent boards are the ones that are able to monitor CEOs the best, and 
that have best corporate governance and therefore results. 
In (Ryan, H.E. & Wiggins, R.A., 2004) there are results that suggest a “direct relation between board 
independence and the change in director compensation”, which stems from the discovery that “firms 
with CEOs who also chair the board are less likely to increase the percentage of equity awards or 
replace cash pay with equity”, signifying that firms with boards dependent on the CEO tend to lose 
incentive to control the CEO and let them change their compensation package so that it is less and less 
influenced by firm performance, making sure they keep their compensation high in the short term and 
possibly sacrifice long-term gains for the firm.  
Different types of compensation 
There are varying types of compensation, “usually composed of multiple types of pay, including 
salary, cash bonus, stock bonuses and stock options, among others” according to (Zajac, E.J., 1990). 
The components that are most popular tend to vary with the region that is being analysed, for instance, 
(Basu, S. et al., 2007), states that “in Japan, top executive compensation typically consists of cash 
salary and cash bonus. Stock-based compensation, such as stock options and stock grants, was not 
used until recently due to legal restrictions on share buybacks and unfavourable tax treatments”. This 
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shows that one must be wary of the type of compensation popular in a specific country or region 
before analysing the effect that firms’ performances have on them. (Ely, K.M., 1991) explains that 
“the shift toward long-term plans at this time is consistent with the need for new types of incentive 
schemes brought about by deregulation and changes in bank strategies”, which is in accordance with 
the studies discussed before. 
Another study, (Boyle, G. & Roberts, H., 2012) uses only the salary, bonus and allowances 
components because in New Zealand, where the study is focused, stock and option grants are not a 
popular form of compensation, and therefore not relevant to the study. They do claim that the 
important part of compensation to use is the “firm awarded compensation, i.e. remuneration that is 
under the direct control of the firm”, which is in line with several other studies. In contrast to these 
examples, (Sun, J., Cahan, S.F. & Emanuel, D., 2009) find that “CEO stock option grants for firm 
with high comprehensive compensation committee quality generate higher future operating income”, 
but that “small firms, low growth firms, and firms with losses have problems that cannot be easily 
addressed through incentive compensation”, and therefore there may be some firms in the sample for 
which there is no correlation between compensation and firm performance, due to these 
characteristics. 
Different studies analyse varying components of compensation, with (Ely, K.M., 1991) stating that 
“the use of all components may not be appropriate” because there is “bias arising from errors in 
measuring the long-term components (which) could out-weigh the benefit of using a total 
compensation measure”. They also reason that “firm performance variables are all short-term 
measures”, therefore only short-term compensation measures should be considered. The study 




CEO and director compensation are positively correlated 
A study shows that “CEO and director compensation are positively correlated even after correcting for 
many other factors”, (Brick, I.E., Palmon, O. & Wald, J.K., 2006), suggesting that a reason for this is 
the fact that these compensations are “positively related to firm complexity and the talent and effort 
needed to manage such companies”. On the other hand, they suggest that this correlation reflects 
“cronyism, whereby the board and CEO are more concerned with selfish objectives than with 
protecting shareholders’ interests”. This theory is in line with agency theory, a topic that shall be 
discussed in detail in the next section.  
2.2. Agency Theory 
Per (Zajac, E.J., 1990), “agency theory examines the problems – and partial solutions – that exist when 
a principal delegates decision-making responsibility to an agent who is paid a fee, but whose own 
objectives may conflict with those of the principal”. One study, (Tosi, H.L. et al., 2000) gives a 
description of the problems shareholders have, one of which is that “information asymmetries favour 
the CEO”, as well as “executives are able to use organizational resources to pursue objectives that may 
not be compatible with the best interests of the firm”, such as “large salaries and perks”.  
Studies seem to agree that this is a common issue amongst larger firms because shareholders “cannot 
easily structure and closely supervise the activities of top executives” (Tosi, H.L. et al., 2000). In this 
same study, it was found that in firms with less amount of external control, it is easier for “managers to 
entrench themselves and behave opportunistically, and as a result, extract excessive compensation”. A 
study conducted in 2004, (Ryan, H.E. & Wiggins, R.A., 2004), explains that “as a CEO’s tenure 
increases, he becomes entrenched, influences the selection of new directors and gains greater 
managerial power over the board of directors”, which aids him/her in influencing their own 
compensation package to benefit their purposes. They go on to say that “director compensation in 
firms with entrenched managers provide weaker incentives to monitor management”. This agrees with 
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various other studies that claim that being entrenched gives executives an incentive to change their 
own compensation package as they wish and possibly increase their pay with no concern for the firm 
performance. The same study finds that “independent boards are more willing to monitor the CEO, 
whose ability to impose costs on them declines with their independence”.  
Another point of agreement is that excess pay is either an incentive for agency problems or a result of 
them. For instance, (Brick, I.E., Palmon, O. & Wald, J.K., 2006) suggest that “well-compensated 
directors may be less likely to rock the boat”, and that “excess compensation is associated with firm 
underperformance”. (Basu, S. et al., 2007) further adds that “excess pay related to ownership and 
monitoring variables is negatively associated with subsequent accounting performance, consistent 
with the presence of an agency problem”. This study has also found that “top executive compensation 
decreases as the corporate governance structures become stronger”, emphasizing the point that excess 
compensation is a contributor to weak corporate governance and therefore firm performance. (Sun, J., 
Cahan, S.F. & Emanuel, D., 2009) advocate that “better corporate governance is reflected in higher 
quality compensation committees which are capable of designing and implementing remuneration 
arrangements that will lead to stronger incentives”, which is in line with what other studies claim.  
2.3. ROA and Returns 
There are differing opinions across the literature on whether to use accounting performance using the 
ROA (Return-On-Assets) as a proxy or the stock returns. (Ely, K.M., 1991) postulates that “the return 
on assets is considered because it is a traditional financial accounting measure of performance”, but 
that the returns are also important to consider since they “reflect all public information relevant to 
share values” due to market efficiency. The authors conclude that “the stock return and the accounting 
variables are not substitutes and that accounting variables are useful in explaining variation in changes 
in compensation”. However, not all studies agree with these results, (Basu, S. et al., 2007) finds that in 
their sample of Japanese firms, the lagged ROA coefficient was significant at the 1% level, whereas 
“coefficient estimates for return and lagged return are not statistically significant”, but explains that 
 9 
this “likely reflects the general decline in the Japanese stock market during the period studied” and that 
“Japanese top executive pay is primarily based on accounting profitability rather than sales or stock 
returns”. Another study (Boyle, G. & Roberts, H., 2012) agrees with this for companies based in New 
Zealand, stating that “very little of the variation in pay growth of New Zealand CEOs is attributable to 
variation in firm performance measured by stock returns”; however, we can only conclude that 
countries have different compensation practices and that these must be studied before deciding the 
relevant indicators. 
2.4. Market Trends 
According to a study published by Mercer in 2015, the most relevant factor in determining the base 
salary of an executive is the individual performance, followed by the market benchmark and then the 
organization performance. This study has also shown that from 2014 to 2015 there has been a 
decrease in full cash pay-outs from short term incentive programs, increasing the use of clawback 
conditions and mandatory deferral in which the award will be subject to the achievement of future 
performance goals. In terms of long-term programs, the most notable change from 2014 to 2015 was 
the increase in multi-year performance goals fixed for the duration of the performance cycle instead of 
using one or two-year performance goals. These measures show that the trend currently is to increase 
the focus on long-term performance and try to make sure executives have the right incentives for this. 
Research results from Towers Watson emphasize that across Europe the regulatory framework has 
been changing constantly, placing caps on executive compensation, such as the requirement that at 
least 40% of the variable remuneration should be deferred, among other measures. The study also 
states that the highest pay levels are found in Switzerland, the UK and Spain, with the Nordic 
countries in 8th place and Portugal not even in the ranking. A BCG study criticizes most annual bonus 
plans for their narrow focus on single-year performance, sacrificing long-term performance for short-
term results. The study emphasizes that “[CEO] are rewarded handsomely for the up years but are not 
punished equivalently for the down years”, further stating that even if executives don’t receive their 
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bonus/options are worthless, “in neither case is their own wealth genuinely at risk as it is for the typical 
investor”. This asymmetry leads to risk-taking to obtain short-term benefits for the executives. 




In this dissertation, the analysis conducted will be focused the comparison of companies in three 
distinct geographical locations to assess if there are differences in executive compensations’ relation to 
firm performance. The regions analysed are Portugal and Spain, two Nordic countries, namely 
Sweden and Denmark, and the UK. All the countries analysed are capitalist countries, however, the 
Nordic countries chosen have a very comprehensive welfare state, differentiating them from the other 
three. Portugal and Spain were chosen and will be analysed as a whole due to recent economic 
troubles that were experienced by both countries, which made them interesting targets for this 
analysis. The other three countries were chosen due to the difference between their law systems. Both 
Nordic countries follow the Civil Law, whereas the UK abides by the principles of Common Law. 
These characteristics may contribute to the level and alignment of executive compensation, therefore 
the samples chosen for this investigation. 
The datasets were extracted from Bloomberg, for the years 2013 to 2015, to assemble a suitable panel. 
For the sample representing the UK, companies from the FTSE100 were chosen. From a sample of 
100, a sample of 98 was viable to use, and some reductions had to be made in further regressions due 
to the unavailability of the data for some companies. For the Nordic countries, the OMX Stockholm 
and OMX Copenhagen were used, a total of 62 companies selected due to data availability. Finally, 
for the Iberian Peninsula sample, companies from the PSI20 and IBEX35 were selected, and after 
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removing the companies that did not have compensation data, a sample of 40 companies was left, the 
smallest of the group.  
3.2. Method 
A simple OLS regression method for panel data in Eviews was used; the results required to test for 
heteroscedasticity and normality of the errors to validate these results. The test for heteroscedasticity 
used was White’s test, and the normality test was Jarque-Bera. As expected, there was a lot of 
heteroscedasticity present, and to correct for this, a Robust Least Squares regression was used, to make 
the regression less sensitive to this matter. There was also non-normality present in some of the 
regressions, however, the number of points in each regression is large enough that according to the 
Central Limit Theorem we can say that the distribution is approximately normal and therefore 
consider the p-values calculated as correct. Furthermore, the test conducted to test for normality was 
the Jarque-Bera, which is a test for the skewness/kurtosis of the error distribution, therefore it can have 
a significant error when determining whether an error distribution is normal or not. In the case of this 
dissertation, all regressions that exhibited non-normal errors per the Jarque-Bera test had more than 75 
observations, which is considered large enough to dismiss the non-normality issue. 
3.3. Dependent variables 
In this dissertation, various dependent variables were chosen to analyse the difference between 
executive positions in the companies, as well as different components of compensation. The focus of 
the analysis was the CEO, given that the total compensation as well as bonuses were considered. The 
total compensation of executives as a whole and of the Board of Directors was also explored. The log 
of the dependent variable was used instead of the linear value because of its monetary nature, therefore 
the results can be easier to interpret.  
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3.4. Independent variables 
The independent variables considered were the accounting performance ratios, Return-on-Assets 
(ROA) and Return-on-Equity (ROE), leverage (LEV), the proxy for company size Turnover (Turn), 
the company annual volatility (𝜎𝑎) and the net dividend yield (DivYield).  
3.5. Regressions 
Eight regressions were run, two for each dependent variable, one with contemporary independent 
variables and the other with lagged variables, because per the literature it is possible that performance 
from the year before may have influence in the executive compensation of the present year. The 
equations representing the regressions were the following: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑋𝑖) = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑎 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 
and  
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑋𝑖) = 𝐶 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝜎𝑎(𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1 
Where 𝑋𝑖 is the dependent variable. 




4.1.1 Executive Compensation 
The first variable analysed was the Total Executive Compensation, both with and without lagged 
independent variables. In Tables 1.1 and 1.2 we can see that the contemporary and lagged values of 
the Turnover are significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. It is also possible to see that the 
lagged value of Leverage is significant at the 10% level, suggesting that this might also have an 
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influence in determining executive compensation, although it is a weak significance. These results 
suggest that only firm size is a real factor in determining the compensation of executives, and a large 
significance in unobserved variables is also relevant to notice.  
Table 1.1 – Regression results of Executive Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 15.758 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.016 0.158 Not Significant 
ROE -0.001 0.661 Not Significant 
Lev 0.002 0.522 Not Significant 
Turnover 8.48E-06 0.019 5% 
Volatility 5.73E-03 0.517 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield -0.020 0.328 Not Significant 
 
Table 1.2 – Regression results of Executive Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 15.895 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) 0.004 0.688 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) 0.001 0.799 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) 0.005 0.097 10% 
Turnover(-1) 9.23E-06 0.006 1% 
Volatility(-1) -0.005 0.570 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.025 0.260 Not Significant 
 
4.1.2. Total and Bonus CEO Compensation 
Analysing the Total and Bonus components of the CEO compensation in a similar fashion, it is 
possible to see in tables 1.3 to 1.6 that the Turnover tends to be a very significant explanatory variable, 
both its contemporary and lagged values. This suggests that the size of the company is a large 
determinant in CEO compensation, and that a classic performance indicators such as ROE has no 
statistical significance, which is an interesting result, and in line with some of the literature. 
Furthermore, the lagged value of Leverage has some significance in both the total compensation and 
the bonus component. This shows that if the company in the last year of business had large debt, CEO 
pay would be negatively affected, which is in line with what is expected from analysis of the literature.  
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Table 1.3 – Regression results of CEO Total Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.685 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.041 0.000 1% 
ROE -0.002 0.263 Not Significant 
Lev 0.003 0.203 Not Significant 
Turnover 1.32E-05 0.000 1% 
Volatility 0.014 0.126 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield -0.008 0.700 Not Significant 
 
Table 1.4 – Regression results of CEO Total Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 15.411 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.007 0.498 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) 0.001 0.455 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.006 0.052 10% 
Turnover(-1) 7.57E-06 0.023 5% 
Volatility(-1) -0.005 0.530 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.032 0.134 Not Significant 
 
Interestingly, as it is possible to see in table 1.5, the ROA is significant at the 5% level in explaining the 
CEO Bonus Compensation, as well as at the 1% level in Total Compensation as seen in table 1.3. This 
suggests that CEOs’ salaries are much more reliant on the performance aspect than other executives, 
which is in line with what is expected since most CEOs are in responsible for the day-to-day running 
of the firm and therefore should be incentivized to maximize firm productivity.  
Table 1.5– Regression results of CEO Bonus Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 13.716 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.023 0.015 5% 
ROE -0.001 0.771 Not Significant 
Lev 0.003 0.304 Not Significant 
Turnover 5.74E-06 0.078 5% 
Volatility -0.001 0.920 Not Significant 





Table 1.6 - Regression results of CEO Bonus Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 13.750 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.001 0.863 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) 0.002 0.181 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.006 0.003 1% 
Turnover(-1) 5.33E-06 0.041 5% 
Volatility(-1) 0.001 0.907 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.008 0.561 Not Significant 
 
4.1.3. Total Board of Directors Compensation 
Next, the total BoD compensation is regressed, and the results are similar, however, now the lagged 
values of ROA are significant at the 1% level, suggesting that like CEOs, the members of the board 
have their compensation rely on this accounting measure, however, only the lagged value, whereas the 
CEOs’ salaries are based on the contemporary value. Furthermore, the company’s annualized 
Volatility is significant also at the 1% level, with a negative coefficient, meaning that the board’s 
compensation also relies on whether the company is perceived as risky or not by the market, by having 
higher price fluctuations. The more volatile the prices of a company’s stock are, the lower the 
compensation of its board. 
Table 1.7 – Regression results of Board of Directors Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.013 0.000 1% 
ROA -0.007 0.392 Not Significant 
ROE 0.002 0.236 Not Significant 
Lev -0.004 0.054 10% 
Turnover 2.72E-05 0.000 1% 
Volatility -0.020 0.001 1% 






Table 1.8 - Regression results of Board of Directors Total Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.003 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.023 0.006 1% 
ROE(-1) 0.002 0.104 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.004 0.087 10% 
Turnover(-1) 8.77E-06 0.001 1% 
Volatility(-1) -0.006 0.339 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) 0.007 0.671 Not Significant 
 
4.2. Sweden and Denmark 
4.2.1 Executive Compensation 
Similar to what was done with the UK region, the Nordic countries were analysed, following the same 
pattern and with the same dependent variables. However, the results were different when it concerned 
the Total Executive Compensation, in the sense that the only explanatory variable to have any 
significance was the lagged value of the Leverage. This can be seen in table 2.2. Again, the coefficient 
is negative, and therefore has the same interpretation as before, that the higher the leverage of a Nordic 
company, the lower its’ executives’ total compensation. This might because interest payments for 
highly leveraged companies are too high for the company to be comfortable paying its executives 
higher salaries. Nordic countries might be more sensitive to risk due to high leverage and may possible 
penalize CEOs that lead companies with high debt.  
Table 2.1 – Regression results of Executive Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 17.402 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.002 0.799 Not Significant 
ROE -8.78E-05 0.928 Not Significant 
Lev -0.009 0.153 Not Significant 
Turnover -2.92E-06 0.623 Not Significant 
Volatility -0.011 0.166 Not Significant 




Table 2.2 – Regression results of Executive Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 17.147 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.002 0.936 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) -0.006 0.593 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.028 0.0002 1% 
Turnover(-1) 9.97E-06 0.233 Not Significant 
Volatility(-1) -0.004 0.701 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) 0.005 0.786 Not Significant 
 
4.2.2. Total and Bonus CEO Compensation 
The Total and Bonus CEO compensation is also highly unaffected by the explanatory variables. The 
Total CEO Compensation is only explained by the Turnover, at the 10% level, as can be seen in Table 
2.3. The Bonus compensation is only explained by the lagged values of Volatility and Leverage, at the 
10% and 1% levels, respectively. Unlike the results for the UK companies, the relationships between 
CEO compensation variables and the independent variables chosen are quite weak, which together 
with the permanent significance of the regression constant C, can signify that there are other unknown 
variables that are considered when the CEO compensation is attributed. The Bonus Compensation is 
mostly affected by the lagged values of the variables, whereas the Total Compensation is explained by 
the contemporary. This suggests that the bonuses are attributed per information from the previous 
year, and the salary is based on contemporary variables, or the performance of the company in the 
present year. 
Table 2.3 – Regression results of CEO Total Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 16.782 0.000 1% 
ROA -0.006 0.322 Not Significant 
ROE 0.0003 0.736 Not Significant 
Lev -0.005 0.335 Not Significant 
Turnover 8.83E-06 0.072 10% 
Volatility -0.010 0.124 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield 0.012 0.325 Not Significant 
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Table 2.4 – Regression results of CEO Total Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 16.671 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.006 0.773 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) 0.002 0.870 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.001 0.875 Not Significant 
Turnover(-1) 1.41E-05 0.152 Not Significant 
Volatility(-1) -0.004 0.758 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) 0.005 0.801 Not Significant 
 
Table 2.5– Regression results of CEO Bonus Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 15.293 0.000 1% 
ROA -0.022 0.362 Not Significant 
ROE 0.004 0.762 Not Significant 
Lev -0.033 0.198 Not Significant 
Turnover 0.0000096 0.368 Not Significant 
Volatility -0.003 0.821 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield 0.022 0.240 Not Significant 
 
Table 2.6 - Regression results of CEO Bonus Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 16.492 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.006 0.812 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) -0.009 0.492 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.083 0.006 1% 
Turnover(-1) -5.61E-07 0.967 Not Significant 
Volatility(-1) -0.026 0.080 10% 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) 0.007 0.712 Not Significant 
 
4.2.3. Total Board of Directors Compensation 
In the case of the Total BoD Compensation for Nordic countries, the most significant explanatory 
variable is, like the UK, the contemporary value of the Volatility, followed by both the Turnover and 
its lagged value, as can be seen in tables 2.7 and 2.8. Like before, this shows that the Board of 
Directors compensation is quite reliant on the company’s perceived risk, as well as its size in terms of 
sales. Unlike the UK, the Nordic companies’ Board of Directors’ compensation does not seem to 
depend on its Leverage directly, therefore there are no penalties for the high usage of leverage. 
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Table 2.7 – Regression results of Board of Directors Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 15.888 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.001 0.870 Not Significant 
ROE 5.54E-06 0.991 Not Significant 
Lev 0.001 0.711 Not Significant 
Turnover 4.95E-06 0.097 10% 
Volatility -0.012 0.002 1% 
Net Dividend Yield 0.004 0.636 Not Significant 
 
Table 2.8 - Regression results of Board of Directors Total Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 15.344 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) 0.006 0.604 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) -0.001 0.890 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) 0.001 0.762 Not Significant 
Turnover(-1) 1.04E-05 0.027 5% 
Volatility(-1) 0.009 0.141 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.004 0.658 Not Significant 
 
4.3. Portugal and Spain 
Finally, Portugal and Spain were studied. The results were expected to be interesting due to this region 
being perceived as the most corrupt of the three, with the Nordic countries ranked first as the World’s 
least corrupt, followed by the UK and then Portugal with Spain as last of the studied countries in this 
dissertation.  
4.3.1 Executive Compensation 
Like before, the Total Executive Compensation was tested first. The regression showed that the 
compensation had a very strong relationship with the company Turnover, meaning that size was a 
large factor in executive compensation. Furthermore, as can be seen in table 3.1, the Net Dividend 
Yield has significance at the 5% level. This shows that companies that distribute dividends have higher 
executive compensations according to the positive coefficient, meaning that this factor may be an 
indicator of company health in this region. Finally, as can be seen in table 3.2, the ROE’s lagged value 
is significant at the 10% level, signifying that this measure of compensation is also somewhat 
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contingent on this accounting measure of performance. However, the coefficient is negative, 
indicating that companies that have the most Return-on-Equity may have slightly lower executive 
compensations. This may indicate a slightly better alignment of interests when executives aren’t paid 
excessively. 
Table 3.1 – Regression results of Executive Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.435 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.002 0.863 Not Significant 
ROE -0.002 0.163 Not Significant 
Lev 0.019 0.111 Not Significant 
Turnover 0,0001 0.000 1% 
Volatility -0.003 0.574 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield 0.025 0.034 5% 
 
Table 3.2 – Regression results of Executive Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.850 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.028 0.546 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) -0.003 0.091 10% 
Lev(-1) 0.004 0.777 Not Significant 
Turnover(-1) 0.0001 0.000 1% 
Volatility(-1) -0.006 0.250 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) 0.005 0.627 Not Significant 
 
4.3.2. Total and Bonus CEO Compensation 
The CEO Total Compensation follows the same course as the total executive compensation, as can be 
seen in tables 3.3 and 3.4, with significances in the contemporary ROE, the Net Dividend Yield and 
both values of Turnover. The Bonus CEO Compensation has similar results as for the other regions, 
with the Turnover and the Volatility being significant at the 1% level. However, the lagged values of 
the ROE, Leverage, Turnover and Net Dividend Yield prove to be significant (at the 10%,10%, 1% 
and 1% levels, respectively) in this case. The high significance of the Net Dividend Yield may again 
suggest this is a large indicator for company profitability and therefore a higher ability to pay 
executives for their work. 
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Table 3.3 – Regression results of CEO Total Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.143 0.000 1% 
ROA -0.002 0.931 Not Significant 
ROE -0.003 0.045 5% 
Lev 0.016 0.132 Not Significant 
Turnover 0.0001 0.000 1% 
Volatility -0.013 0.156 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield 0.023 0.010 5% 
 
Table 3.4 – Regression results of CEO Total Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.357 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.036 0.643 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) -0.004 0.121 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.005 0.809 Not Significant 
Turnover(-1) 0.0002 0.000 1% 
Volatility(-1) -0.011 0.196 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.009 0.579 Not Significant 
 
Table 3.5– Regression results of CEO Bonus Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 11.551 0.000 1% 
ROA 0.013 0.722 Not Significant 
ROE 0.001 0.644 Not Significant 
Lev -0.022 0.215 Not Significant 
Turnover 0.0001 0.000 1% 
Volatility 0.042 0.007 1% 
Net Dividend Yield -0.018 0.154 Not Significant 
 
Table 3.6 -Regression results of CEO Bonus Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 13.276 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) -0.010 0.852 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) -0.003 0.079 10% 
Lev(-1) -0.027 0.069 10% 
Turnover(-1) 0.0001 0.000 1% 
Volatility(-1) 0.001 0.937 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.137 0.000 1% 
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4.3.3. Total Board of Directors Compensation 
The Total BoD compensation variable for Portugal and Spain behaves slightly differently from the 
other regions, with only the Net Dividend Yield proving to be significant at the 1% level and the lagged 
value of Turnover as well, as can be seen in tables 3.7 and 3.8. This may reinforce the proposition that 
was made before, insomuch as that in these countries, the Net Dividend Yield is a signifier of company 
health, therefore signals the possibility that the company can afford higher salaries. As in the other 
regions, the lagged value of the Turnover is also very significant in explaining the Total BoD 
Compensation, however, the contemporary value seems not to have any impact in this region, unlike 
in the other regions. 
Table 3.7 – Regression results of Board of Directors Compensation with contemporary variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.167 0.000 1% 
ROA -0.020 0.702 Not Significant 
ROE 0.002 0.413 Not Significant 
Lev -0.013 0.537 Not Significant 
Turnover 4.09E-05 0.195 Not Significant 
Volatility -0.003 0.770 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield 0.041 0.028 1% 
 
Table 3.8 - Regression results of Board of Directors Total Compensation with lagged variables 
Variable 𝛽 p-value Significance 
C 14.035 0.000 1% 
ROA(-1) 0.006 0.868 Not Significant 
ROE(-1) 0.001 0.411 Not Significant 
Lev(-1) -0.009 0.358 Not Significant 
Turnover(-1) 6.18E-05 0.000 1% 
Volatility(-1) -0.003 0.452 Not Significant 
Net Dividend Yield(-1) -0.004 0.617 Not Significant 
 
In this region, we can see a strong emphasis on the Net Dividend Yield, unlike the other regions 
studied. This shows there is a significant difference between regions and their compensation schemes, 
as was somewhat expected due to different country regulations and law schemes. Unlike the Nordic 
countries studied and the UK, Leverage is not very significant, suggesting that these two countries’ 
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compensation schemes do not have such a high sensitivity to indebtedness. The conclusions of this 
study will be analysed in the next section. 
5. Conclusion 
Emerged from the research that there are several similarities in the regions researched, namely the 
importance of Turnover and company size, in explaining most of the compensation components 
analysed. The results show that executive compensation is sensitive to the company size, i.e., larger 
the company, higher the executives’ compensation. This result is in line with the content of the 
literature review. Also, all the regressions that were run had a very significant constant C, always 
significant at the 1% level. This suggests that there are various unobserved variables that can explain 
the compensation of executives that are not being analysed by this model. 
The UK was the region whose compensation most depends on Turnover, being this and leverage the 
most relevant variables. Compensation’s relationship with leverage emerged as negative, which shows 
that the higher the company’s leverage, the lower the compensation; this might suggest that the high 
interest payments lead towards lower profits, and therefore, lower compensation packages. 
In Portugal and Spain region, the Net Dividend Yield turned out to be significant, unlike in the other 
regions. This shows that in Iberia, the dividend yield signifies company health and therefore, raises the 
ability to pay higher salaries to executives. However, this variable is only significant in Iberia possibly 
suggesting that, either healthy companies are not distributing the same proportion of dividends as they 
should, or alternatively, management is somehow preventing dividends from being distributed to 
maximise their own compensation. In Iberia, emerged more diversity in terms of significant 
explanatory variables when compared to the other regions, namely a higher importance of ROE, albeit 
having a negative impact on compensation. This higher performance may indicate, as suggested 
beforehand, that some companies might overpay executives and therefore, have lower performance, 
emphasizing the agency theory in favour of executives. 
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The Nordic countries (Norway and Denmark) analysed are those where compensation is the least 
affected by the explanatory variables chosen; this may possibly due to specific country regulations or 
even to the political system or cultural background. Unlike the UK and Iberia, Turnover does not seem 
to be the most significant explanatory variable, as several regressions where there are no significant 
variables.  
This dissertation contributed to the body of knowledge by providing a relevant comparison between 
three distinct regions including five countries and their compensation schemes, as well as providing an 
insight into the corporate culture of these countries, by defining which parameters impact or not the 
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